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ABSTRACT
Android is currently the most widely used mobile operating system. The permission
model in Android governs the resource access privileges of applications. The permis-
sion model however is amenable to various attacks, including re-delegation attacks, back-
ground snooping attacks and disclosure of private information. This thesis is aimed at un-
derstanding, analyzing and performing forensics on application behavior. This research
sheds light on several security aspects, including the use of inter-process communications
(IPC) to perform permission re-delegation attacks.
Android permission system is more of app-driven rather than user controlled, which
means it is the applications that specify their permission requirement and the only thing
which the user can do is choose not to install a particular application based on the require-
ments. Given the all or nothing choice, users succumb to pressures and needs to accept
permissions requested. This thesis proposes a couple of ways for providing the users finer
grained control of application privileges. The same methods can be used to evade the
Permission Re-delegation attack.
This thesis also proposes and implements a novel methodology in Android that can
be used to control the access privileges of an Android application, taking into consider-
ation the context of the running application. This application-context based permission
usage is further used to analyze a set of sample applications. We found the evidence of ap-
plications spoofing or divulging user sensitive information such as location information,
contact information, phone id and numbers, in the background. Such activities can be
used to track users for a variety of privacy-intrusive purposes. We have developed imple-
mentations that minimize several forms of privacy leaks that are routinely done by stock
applications.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Android Operating System is one of the most prominent platforms for mobile devices. A
recent survey claims that Android dominates the world smart phone market with more
than 80 percent share. One of the main reasons can be attributed to its transparent nature
and open-source approach. Despite these characteristics, Android does pose few threats
when concerned to user privacy. Android uses permissions mechanism to grant access to
certain privileges and components to an app. This information of what permissions the
app requires is specified beforehand for the user to decide upon whether to install the app
or not. Though this sounds like a good approach the access control is app-driven rather
than user-driven. In other words, it is the app which decides what it can access but not the
user, the only thing which the user can control at this point is whether he/she wants to
install the app or not, given its permission requirements. Moreover, consider a scenario
where an app has access to sensitive information which the user does not allow to be
shared with other entities both internal, which can include other apps in the same device,
and external entities. Currently, there is no way for the user to know if the app is not
misusing its granted permissions, which makes the user to blindly trust the app. Given
this current architecture, the central idea of this thesis work is to design a framework in
Android which would rather give control to the user on what components a particular
app can access. Also, the thesis is aimed at designing a way to let the user know if an app
is trying to misuse its permissions.
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Date Applications available
May, 2011 200, 000
Jan, 2012 400, 000
May, 2012 500, 000
July, 2013 1,000,000
July, 2014 1,300,000
Table 1.1: Google Play Applications Timeline
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Need for User Driven Permission Management
With the current trend in technology, a mobile phone is capable of taking pictures,
tracking location and even do processing almost equivalent to that of a desktop computers.
Users have also adapted to these advances in mobile device technology and started using
mobile phones for a variety of purposes thanks to the rich app library available across
various platforms. Specifically this thesis concentrates on the Android framework, which
provides more than 1.3 million apps available to be downloaded by users, as of July 2014.
The number of apps in Google Play seems to be increasing in a rapid way with a growth
of over 600% in the span of 3 years. The stats in Table 1.1 show the rate at which Android
applications increase in Google Play over the past 3 years[42].
1.1.1.1 Increasing Malware
The increasing number of applications in Google Play store shows how prominent
Android has become among users, but on the downside this also gives more scope to
introduce malware and threats to a broader audience. There are many studies/surveys
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conducted over the years which also suggest the increasing malware apps in the Google
Play market. A study on increase of malware in Android conducted by Sophos Labs
[29], claims that the malware tend to increase 81 times since 2010 to 2011. Later the
malware rose even 41 times more in the time span on 2011 - 2012. A similar study by
Network World [43] claims the count of malware specimens available in Google Play
in a time span from June to October 2012 increased by 600%. This rise of malware in
Android market makes the system quite vulnerable and a recent study on Mobile Threat
Report by Webroot [40] claims more than 40% of Android apps analyzed were labeled as
either malicious, suspicious or unwanted. Moreover, about 6 out of 10 Android apps are
a potential security concern, these apps have a high chance of jeopardizing users’ privacy.
These malwares are responsible for leaking user’s personal data on many occasions.
For instance, the popular Brightest Flashlight app which has more than a million down-
loads was reported to have misused ID and location data collected from its users [8] .
This data collected was later shared with ad networks which has powerful tools to classify
a user based on his personal and location data. On another instance in 2012, the widely
used business-oriented social networking service LinkedIn has been reported to transmit
user’s data without their knowledge [10]. Similarly another social networking giant ap-
plication Path was also known to upload entire address book of users to their servers [11].
These are only a few instances quoted among the various user data leaks from user’s An-
droid mobile devices due to either malware or bad-intention/ignorance of the developers
of the apps.
1.1.1.2 Increasing Over-privileged apps
Another important factor which plays a key role in protecting a user’s privacy is the
number of applications which tend to require far more extra permissions than that are
required for the app behavior. Though few extra permissions which seem to be contex-
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tually inapplicable for the purpose of an app might make the users stop and think about
installing the app onto the user’s device. But there might be very few users who tend
not to install the application due to this, an example of this can be taken for Facebook
Android app. Though there weren’t any reports of data leak or threats originating from
the Facebook application there was a small user group which was alarmed at the update
for Facebook earlier this year which gives the privilege for the app to read SMS. Though
later a clarification from an engineer from Facebook sorted the debate by explaining that
they require the permission to read SMS only to intercept login approval SMS messages as
part of 2-factor authentication for their accounts. It doesn’t stop the application to read
SMS of users for another malicious purposes thus risking the privacy of the user [33].
In this aspect a previous study made by Felt et al. [21], which intends to find out how
many apps are over privileged. Among their sample of 940 applications, about one-third
of the applications seem to be over privileged. More than 50% of these over-privileged ap-
plications seem to have one extra permission and about 6% request more than four extra
permissions. On a related study by Mario Frank et al. [26], the permission request ac-
tivities of over 188,000 various Android applications were tracked. This study enlists the
top 15 Android permissions which are being requested by these apps in various scenarios.
Out of the top 15 Android permissions more than 50% belong to the set of dangerous per-
missions which involve reading personal information, read contents of the SD card, user’s
location activity, network connectivity and also permissions related to services that cost
money for the user like placing phone call, sending SMS etc. Also out of all the permis-
sion request patterns the percentage of permissions related to services involved in user’s
privacy accounted to more than 70%. This study is a conclusive evidence that majority of
the apps have access to sensitive user data which may have a potential chance of landing
in the wrong hands.
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Correlating the above information of how apps are being used in the current scenario
right from trivial pastime activities to critical applications which involve interacting with
sensitive user information related to IDs, Credit cards, Bank accounts, Location history,
Phone book and other personal information. It makes more sense for the user to control
what an app can access rather than blindly relying on the app itself. The above factors are
one of the main motivating factors for necessity of User driven permission management.
1.1.2 Motivating Example
The research for this thesis is to investigate the possibilities and limitations of an app
trying to compromise privacy of a user in Android. The idea originated while developing
an app as part of one of the course projects. The Android app developed intends to help
an instructor to keep track of the attendance of a class with the help of barcode scanning
using the camera application of a user’s smart phone. The app was built successfully which
leverages on the Barcode Scanner application to be pre-installed on user’s mobile device.
The following steps describe the use case which involves reading the barcode:
• Invoke the Barcode Scanner app from Attendance Tracker app
• Scan the barcode using the already installed Barcode Scanner app
• Process the barcode from the image scanned
• Barcode Scanner app returns the processed barcode to the requested app
• Attendance Tracker app logic flows . . .
In the above steps it should be noted that the actual barcode is scanned from the Bar-
code Scanner app but not the Attendance Tracker app. In this scenario since scanning the
barcode requires the android.permissions.CAMERA, it seems intuitive that the Atten-
dance Scanner app also possesses the same permission. But with the current way Android
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Figure 1.1: Pictorial Representation of Permission Re-delegation
permissions are processed for apps the Attendance Tracker app does not need to require
the android.permissions.CAMERA permission. The argument being, since the scanning
of barcode is done in the Barcode Scanner app, it is the Barcode Scanner app which re-
quires the android.permissions.CAMERA permission. Attendance Tracker app was able
to indirectly access the information processed by Barcode Scanner by accessing Camera,
even when the Attendance Tracker app cannot access Camera by itself. The attack in this
scenario where an under-privileged app delegates a task to a better-privileged app in order
to get the information from resources to which the under-privileged app does not have
access to is known as Permission Re-delegation. This is visually illustrated in Figure 1.1.
This scenario can be replicated between any two apps using Intents in Android, which
are explained in detail in the coming sections. Although this seems trivial in this scenario
we could imagine the same situation happening between a Malicious app with no access
to user-sensitive data and a Sensitive app with access to user-sensitive data. Even though
Malicious app cannot access the user-sensitive data on its own, it can take advantage of
Sensitive app which might allow other apps to read the data. This scenario was the mo-
tivating factors which made me look into and understand various actions performed in
Android related to security.
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1.1.3 Need for Monitoring the Activities of Android Apps
Giving complete control to end-user in choosing which apps can have access to which
permissions, though seem to be a reasonable solution to control user’s privacy. Felt et
al.[23], conducted a behavioral survey of Android users, the results of which indicated
only 17% of the users paid checked keenly about the permissions the app is requesting
during installation. On the negative side more than 42% of the people were not even aware
of the permissions being requested by the apps during installation. This survey proves that
rather than completely leveraging on the end-user to choose proper permissions for apps,
there should also be a system which continuously tracks the permission request patterns
of an application and notify the user/centralized-system 1 about the possible threats to
user’s privacy. Thus the user/centralized-system can take effective counter measures in
vetting the app there by ensuring the threat can be avoided further.
The above consolidate the main motivating factors for formulating the main idea of
this thesis work.
1.2 Organization
1.2.1 Methodology
The work proposed and presented in this thesis is done following an Incremental
model of Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC). The software proposed is done in
an evolutionary fashion. So rather than considering the entire work as a single project,
it is divided into multiple projects which in turn follow the usual phases: requirement
gathering, design, implementation and evaluation, as identified in a typical SDLC. Subse-
quent projects take the results of previous projects as inputs and the software continues
to evolve until the final product.
1The centralized-system in this context refers to the Google Play entity in Android.
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1.2.2 Document Outline
With the methodology explained, the rest of the document is organized in the fol-
lowing way. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Background information about Android
architecture along with its permission enforcement scheme. Also it explains the process
of installation and running of an Android app.
Some more information is provided with respect to the related work in Chapter 3.
These works come under the domain of security, permissions and user privacy in An-
droid.
Chapter 4 deals with the project involving static analysis of Android applications to
track potential intents that can make a permission re-delegation attack.
Chapter 5 deals with the project allowing users to choose the permissions of Android
applications during install time on their devices.
Chapter 6 deals with the project allowing users to dynamically enforce constraints
during runtime with respect to permissions being applicable to applications.
Chapter 7 encompasses the project which tracks the permission usage of Android ap-
plications especially taking into consideration the running context of the application.
Chapter 8 gives a formal conclusion of this thesis along with a brief outline on the
future work that can be done to make Android a much better system in ensuring the
privacy of users.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Android, Inc. has its roots in 2003, during which it was originally intended to be devel-
oped as an advanced operating system for digital cameras. However after realizing the
lack of market for such an operating system built for cameras, the goal was shifted to
make Android as a smart phone operating system. After its acquisition into Google in
2005, the latter wanted to make Android as a platform for smart phones which succeeded
immensely. Android kept improving its performance since then and released updates pe-
riodically with Android L (Lollipop) being the latest one release in 2014.
2.1 Android Architecture
Android Architecture is majorly renown for its efficient customization of Linux ker-
nel in building a platform base to run applications. The architecture based on Linux
kernel down the stack, exercises each application to run independently in a sandboxed
environment created by Dalvik Runtime or Android Runtime which can be considered
analogous to the renown Java’s Virtual Machine environment. Each application running
in Android even though independent of one another are still tied together by the Binder
mechanism for inter-process communication (IPC). This IPC mechanism is developed
with the ideal characteristics and Security, Scalability, Stability, Memory optimization
are a few to name. Android utilizes this Binder along with adding many more useful cus-
tomized features like AIDL, Process Identification from UID/PID etc. In fact the most
frequent Activity callbacks for app which include onResume(), onDestroy() in the high
level services, like ActivityManagerService, use binder in the low-level for its imple-
mentation. The coming sections briefly describe the basic blocks of an Android applica-
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tion before going into the details with respect to Android Permission Model and process
model which are topics of significant importance to this thesis.
2.2 Android Application Components
Typical Android applications include the following components which serve as build-
ing blocks of an application.
2.2.1 Activity
An activity represents the visual view of an app. Usually an app consists of a list of
Activities, instances of which are loaded every time user is trying to interact with the app
in the foreground. Activities together can be termed as the face of an app. Activities in
turn use Fragments, Views to render UI related entities. As mentioned in the previous
section an Activity Lifecycle consists of various states[13].
• An activity is present in active or running states if it is in the foreground.
• An activity is in paused state if it has lost focus but is still visible for the end-user.
Though the activity is paused it retains a copy of its state and other information
from it is active state.
• An activity is in stopped state if it is no longer visible to end-user. The user can
still retrieve the state of the app if the app is still running. Under low memory
conditions Android system will often kill these no longer used apps to free memory
to be used by other active applications.
Storing the state information of an Activity can be facilitated using various methods
available as part of the Activity API in Android.
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2.2.2 Intent
An intent in Android is an abstract way of performing operations. Intents are used
to invoke few entities which usually include from launching an Activity to starting a ser-
vice. Usually intents are also provide a way to invoke Activities from other applications
thus facilitating late runtime binding between different applications[15]. This is a way
for inter-app communication in Android where apps run in a sand-boxed environment.
Further sections in this thesis also deals with ways of dealing with intents which might
be a potential way to leak data among multiple applications.
2.2.3 Service
A Service in an Android app represents a background running operation without the
interaction with end-user. Applications usually use Services to gather data in the back-
ground and make it ready for Activities in the app when it is in the foreground.
2.2.4 Broadcast Receiver
A Broadcast Receiver can be made to listen for any incoming messages from system
and other applications via intents. The Broadcast Receivers are used to notify other related
components when specific events occur.
Linking of all these components is responsible for the smooth running of an applica-
tion in Android.
2.3 Internals of an APK file
The previous sections briefly outlined various components of Android system which
are necessary for an app to run in Android. This section gives an overview of various
components of an APK file. An APK (application package) file is the file format used to
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distribute applications in Android. Architectures of Android runtimes Dalvik and ART
have clearly explained the key component of an Android application which is the dex file
created after compiling the byte codes of all the java source files in Android. The following
lists various directories and files of an APK file[41].
AndroidManifest.xml
Every application in Android is required to have this file in its root directory. The
manifest file usually contains app specific information like name, icon, sdk-version,
app compatible settings etc. Along with the above it also lists all the components
that are present in this applications. The components include Activities, Services,
Intents, intent-filters etc. The next key feature of the manifest file which is probably
the point of interest for this thesis work is Permissions. Since an application in
Android is run its sand-boxed environment, it should let the system know which
external resources the app in intended to utilize. These are usually represented in the
form of Permissions in Android. The <uses-permission /> tag in the manifest
file represents the permissions to use system resources. This manifest file acts as an
integrating entity which puts together all the components of the application.
lib/
This directory usually contains compiled code of various supporting libraries which
are referred usually in the application components. This directory in turn has differ-
ent directories representing the processor base for which the libraries are compiled
for e.g., arm, x86, mips etc.
res/
This directory contains the resources which are used in the application. An example
of resources can be various images required in the UI layout of an Activity.
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assets/
This directory contains application assets. These can be accessed programmatically
in Android using AssetManager.
classes.dex
The dex file generated after compiling the bytecodes of all the java source files in
the applications.
resources.arsc
This is a precompiled binary of the contents of resource directory mentioned above.
META-INF/
In order for the system to maintain a unique identity of authors of applications,
apps are required to be signed before installation in Android. The contents of this
directory contain the manifests and certificates of its digital signature.
2.4 Android Permission Model
Android operating system which is built on top of a Linux Kernel, runs each appli-
cation as a Linux process in low-level. During the install time every package is assigned
a unique Linux user ID. The UID remains constant as long as the package remains on
the device. Although in the low-level the application is represented by a Linux process,
the application as a whole is run in specific runtime either Dalvik Virtual Machine or
Android Runtime as seen in the previous sections. Assigning an unique UID to each
application encourages the sand-boxed environment created for each application in An-
droid. Even though multiple applications are installed on a device having a unique id for
each application wouldn’t let an app to access contents of any other app by default.
In order to facilitate Inter Process communication (IPC), Intents are utilized which
would allow the applications to pass data among them. Intents can be filtered using intent-
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filters which control the access level of intents from apps. If an app specifies a filter to re-
ceive implicit Intents, then it is public and any intents to this are allowed. On the contrary
they would not be allowed.
Coming to access control semantics, Android enforces access controlling features us-
ing Permissions. There a total of 146 permissions[16] introduced as of API level 20. Each
of these permissions can be categorized into the several ways, below listed are few impor-
tant categories of permissions:
Services that cost you money
These permissions usually refer to services capable of calling and sending text.
Network communication
These mainly refer to the INTERNET connectivity permission. Others can in-
clude WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC etc.
Your Location
These have the capability to access fine (GPS), accurate (WiFi), coarse (network-
based) location.
Microphone
These have the capability to record audio.
Camera
These have the capability to control the Camera of the device.
Storage
These have access to read, modify or delete contents of internal storage or SD card.
The above categories are only a few of the lot and are listed to emphasize their impor-
tance with respect to user’s privacy. The permissions of an app should be listed using the
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<uses-permission /> tag in AndroidManifest.xml file. The Figure 2.1 shows sample
listing of permissions in manifest file[17]:
Figure 2.1: Sample of Android Manifest File with App Using READ_SMS Permission
Other than these 146 predefined permissions, Android also allows developers to create
their own permissions and these custom permissions each be defined with a protection
level[18], listed below, based on the type permission.
Normal
Normal permissions refer to the type of permissions which have their impact on
end-user experience but they are not harmful to the user with respect to type of
content they have access to.
Dangerous
Dangerous permissions refer to the above list of categories which have access to
services that cost the user, dealing with personal data of user etc. These are regarded
as highly sensitive with respect to user privacy.
System/Signature
These are probably the most powerful permissions, which have the ability to con-
trol/kill other apps running in the background. Hence these permissions are not
generally granted to app developers. Rather these are granted only to the applica-
tions which are installed during the manufacturing process of the device.
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The figure 2.2 shows a sample definition of a dangerous level permission in the context
of com.me.app.myapp application[17].
Figure 2.2: Sample of Android Manifest File Defining a Custom Permission
DEADLY_ACTIVITY
With the above context on Permissions in Android, figure 2.3 depicts the basic security
model for the system[34].
Figure 2.3: Permission Access Control Mechanism in Android
The next subsection gives an idea about how these permissions are enforced for an app
in Android.
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2.4.1 Permission Enforcement in Android apps
Most of the permissions in Android are enforced at the Android framework level
present in the Android software stack. Typically from the framework level, there is only
one publicly available API method in ActivityManagerService to check for the per-
missions for a given app. The coming sections illustrate how ActivityManagerService
plays a key role in launching an application, given such high privilege it only fits that the
checkPermission API method belongs to the same class.
Listing 2.1: checkPermission() method in ActivityManagerService
/**
* As the only public entry point for permissions checking, this method
* can enforce the semantic that requesting a check on a null global
* permission is automatically denied. (Internally a null permission
* string is used when calling {@link #checkComponentPermission} in
* cases when only uid-based security is needed.)
*
* This can be called with or without the global lock held.
*/
public int checkPermission(String permission, int pid, int uid) {
if (permission == null) {
return PackageManager.PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
return checkComponentPermission(permission, pid, uid, -1);
}
The listing 2.1 illustrates the implementation of the only publicly available API for
checking permissions in ActivityManagerService. Since each app in Android is enti-
tled with a distinct unique UID, majorly the outcome of checkPermission is dependent
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on the UID along with the listed permission. The later calls in the stack starting from
checkComponentPermission method eventually refer to the PackageManagerService
which stores the repository of permissions for the app by parsing its AndroidManifest.xml
file.
Not all permissions in Android are enforced at the framework level, there are few per-
missions which are enforced at the kernel level using the concept of supplementary group-
id[39]. Among these permissions which are enforced at group id level are the INTERNET,
CAMERA, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, BLUETOOTH etc. In Unix with 4.2 BSD, the con-
cept of supplementary group IDs was introduced. This allowed the users if part of a
specific group to have all the privileges of that group. The user could also belong to 16
such groups along with tailored access specified at user id level. All the above mentioned
permissions were enforced using the supplementary group ids. The supplementary group
ids were assigned based on the permissions the app has in its manifest file. This mapping
of permissions with group id’s are fetched from the platform.xml file. Below is an example
of snippet from the data/etc/platform.xml file:
Listing 2.2: Permission and Group-ID Mapping from data/etc/platform.xml
<permission name="android.permission.INTERNET" >
<group gid="inet" />
</permission>
If an app has any of these kind of permissions, then at the install time the group ids
are set to the corresponding uid of the app accordingly. The below methods in listing 2.3
are utilized to set the enforce the group id.
Listing 2.3: API Methods Available for set/get/init Group-IDs in Linux
#include <grp.h> /* on Linux */
#include <unistd.h> /* on FreeBSD, Mac OS X, and Solaris */
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int getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t grouplist[]);
/* Returns: number of supplementary group IDs if OK, 1 on error*/
int setgroups(int ngroups, const gid_t grouplist[]);
int initgroups(const char *username, gid_t basegid);
/* Both return: 0 if OK, 1 on error */
Also the permissions can be used to secure components of an app. For instance if
an Activity is declared with a permission, only apps with the corresponding permissions
have the ability to start the Activity using intents. The below declaration in the manifest
file depicts the same.
Listing 2.4: Securing Activity Using Permissions in Android Applications
<activity android:name="SecureActivity"
android.permission="com.mypermission.SECURE_ACTIVITY_PERMISSION">
<intent-filter>
...
</intent-filter>
</activity>
In the above example, only applications bearing the custom permission can invoke the
SecureActivity using intents, the rest of intents are blocked. In the same way permissions
can be used to secure other components like Services, Content Providers etc, in Android.
After illustrating the permission model in Android, the coming section describes how
each of these come into picture during the installation of an application package (apk) file
in Android system.
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2.5 Android Application Installation
In Android an application is installed using the APK file. The default system applica-
tion PackageInstaller is responsible for initiating the installation process of the app.
The previous section shows how each app has a distinct user id thus enabling the app to
be installed in its own sand-box environment. The following are the steps involved in
installing the package[31].
1. Add package to installation process queue
2. Identify location for installing package
3. Determining type of operation install or update
4. Copy apk file to the concerned directory (usually /data/app/)
5. Assign a distinct UID for the package
6. Create directories for application and set privileges to the UID assigned in the pre-
vious step
7. Extract the classes.dex file from the APK file into the directory
8. Update packages.xml file with the new package
9. Notify user with the installation complete status
From the above steps, the major part involved with parsing/extracting the apk files, is
dealt with PackageManagerService. Creating the directories and setting the appropriate
rights for the UID is accomplished by the deamon process called installd. Once the
installation is complete, the user is notified appropriately with the status by the activities
of PackageInstaller application. Also a repository of package related data is stored
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for faster access in other operations, and /data/system/packages.xml is one file that is
updated along with all the permissions of the package. The following listing shows the
structure of packages.xml.
Listing 2.5: Structure of /data/system/packages.xml
<packages>
<last-platform-version external="15" internal="15">
<permission-trees>
<permissions>
<item name="android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE"
package="android" protection="1">
<item name="android.permission.ASEC_ACCESS" package="android"
protection="2">
...
</item></permissions>
<package codepath="/path/to/package.apk" name="com.app.mypackage"... >
<perms>
<item name="android.permission.mypackage.permission">
</perms>
</package>
...
</packages>
PackageManagerService uses repositories like these to list information of package
when queried by other applications. Once the package is installed, the next section de-
scribes how the process management works for Android applications.
21
2.6 Android Application Process Management
Previous sections describe about how an application in Android is a separate Linux
process that runs in its own runtime either Dalvik Virtual Machine or Android Runtime,
but this doesn’t mean that every process in Android runs in a similar. For instance there
are many low level Linux processes which get spawned at the start up. These low level
Linux processes are generally responsible for handling hardware interfaces. Apart from
these low level handler processes, there exists another special process called Zygote.
2.6.1 Zygote
Zygote, as the name suggests, is the origin of all the processes related to Android appli-
cations. Typically when and Android application is launched, Zygote plays a key role in
the lower level. Zygote is the process which spawns a new Linux process with the specific
arguments for each application based on the configuration of the app. Zygote is also a
termed as a "Warmed up" process since it is already linked and equipped with all the core
libraries of Android which were described in the previous section. The main advantage
of spawning new applications from Zygote is that, all the processes related to spawned
applications do not need to have a copy of the core libraries. The memory/libraries are
copied to the newly spawned process only in the case where the process intends to change
them. Thus having a shared library with well-equipped Zygote process is majorly respon-
sible for better performance with less memory footprint. Once Zygote is initialized, it
opens a socket and continuously loops for any incoming socket connections. The next
subsection illustrates how an application is launched from Zygote in Android[12].
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2.6.2 Android Application Launch
After the start up, an application is typically launched by the end user by interacting
with the Launcher. There are 3 major phases involved in the Application launch[28].
2.6.2.1 Creating the Process
When the application launch is requested, system first checks for any existing instance
of the process in the memory. If it exists the system will load the process and return the
same process id back to ActivityManagerService. Otherwise the package is initially
parsed to gather its permissions which are transformed into a specific group ids which
take play a key role in the access control mechanism of Android. This process of transfor-
mation is illustrated in the previous sections which describe about Android Permission
Model. After parsing this package and gathering the required uid, gids and process specific
details a Binder call is made to ActivityManagerServicewhich is responsible for instan-
tiating the Process record[19] for the Application. Through ActivityManagerService,
a ZygoteSocket connection is established. After establishing a socket connection with
Zygote, it is responsible for forking process and thus returning the process id back to
ActivityManagerService.
2.6.2.2 Binding the Application
Once the process has been created from Zygote, each process spawns a new thread
called the Activity thread which is responsible for forwarding appropriate messages to
handler. This is typically done by the thread by sending a BIND_APPLICAITION mes-
sage to the handler. This phase is responsible for invoking the methods which loads the
app specific libraries/classes into the memory.
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2.6.2.3 Launching the Application
Once the process is created and the corresponding classes for the application are loaded
into the process’s memory, the next step is to launch the activity which was initially
sent to the ActivityManagerService from the Launcher. This process involves sending
LAUNCH_ACTIVITY message to the handler, which then propagates down the stack
and the appropriate activity is launched in the foreground to the end user.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the typical use-case of launching an application described above.
Figure 2.4: Android Application Launch Phases: 1. Creating the Process 2. Binding the
Application 3. Launching the Activity
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Chapter 3
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORKS
Previous chapters evidently show that permissions play a key role in determining what an
app can access and what not. So it is for the best to ensure that permissions are not utilized
maliciously, breaking the trust and breaching the privacy of the user. Felt et al. devised
a tool called Stowaway[21] to find out how many apps are over privileged. Their study
shows that about one-third of the applications (among their sample of 940 applications)
are using more number of permissions than required for the app.
3.1 Permission Re-Delegation
One of the other possible attack is Permission Re-delegation or Permission Escalation,
which was already illustrated on Chapter 1. With the help of Android’s inter-process com-
munication entity, Intents, permissions re-delegation might be a potential threat to user’s
privacy. Felt et al. have implemented a IPC Inspection mechanism[22] for browser and
Android and were able to prevent the Permission Re-delegation. In their implementation,
they have come up with simple rules to block the attack where malicious applications
tend to take leverage from other applications to access unauthorized content. Felt et al.
designed the inspection system largely based on, restricted invocation of the Deputy app
as they presented in their work. Part of this thesis work is aimed at blocking the Permis-
sion Re-delegation attack and the defense mechanism for this attack also took roots from
the similar approach where the deputy app is launched with set of permissions which are
common to both the requester and deputy app. Thus ensuring no chance of leakage of
unauthorized content to the requester app from the deputy app.
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3.2 Static Analysis to Find Malicious Intents
Before moving to the dynamic approach of restricting attacks and blocking applica-
tions, preliminary part of the thesis also tried to perform static analysis of Android ap-
plications to detect any possibility of intents being misused to perform permission re-
delegation attack. Enck et al. had done a study of Android Application Security[20],
where they have proposed a way to thoroughly perform static analysis of Android ap-
plications. Through this work they essentially have shown how traditional Static Code
Analysis techniques can be applied in Android Applications. The entire analysis used four
approaches: control flow, data flow, structural, and semantic analysis. This study using
existing static code analysis tools, was able to show how Phone Identifiers, Location de-
tails etc. were exposed. Apart from findings where applications transmit user sensitive
data across the internet, the control flow analysis part also included analysis of IPC calls
in Android. Though their study tried to showcase a wide-range of findings with respect
to their analysis of Android applications, this thesis tries to perform the static analysis
of Android applications specifically to identify intents that might be potential causes for
Permission Re-delegation attack.
3.3 Enforcing Dynamic Constraints on Permission Usage in Android
Although static analysis says what can possibly happen, the dynamic monitoring is
the only way to control what exactly happens. With the same idea, this thesis also aims
at providing a runtime permission model which would be able to restrict applications on
how they take leverage of permission-model in Android. Apex[30], proposed by Nau-
man et al., extends the Android Permission model by providing the users with the ability
to enforce permissions as well as constraints related to the same for their applications.
App Ops[14] in Android also allows users to control the permissions granted to their ap-
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plications. App Ops which was accidentally released to the AOSP code base in Android
4.3 version, provides the user with fine-grained privacy controls for the end users. Figure
3.1 depicts the interface provided by Android’s App Ops. This App Ops feature was re-
moved in the next installment from Android, mentioning this isn’t a tool for end users to
have[27].
Figure 3.1: App Ops Interface in Android 4.3 (a) Categorizing Apps by permissions (b)
Fine-grained Permission Control (c) AppInfo Listing Permission Details of an Applica-
tion
Apart from providing the user with fine grained permission control, there is also a
need to analyze how these permissions are being used in Android. Xu et al. proposed
Permlyzer[44], a tool to analyze the permission usage in Android Applications. They
were able to identify majorly for what purpose a set of permissions are invoked and how
they are invoked. Along with this, they also identified potential scenarios on how a ma-
licious application will target to gather user’s personal information. They have provided
a detailed study of how permissions are being used, and proposed a sustainable design to
handle large set of applications. This thesis also analyzes the permission usage of applica-
tions in runtime and also takes into consideration the context of the application running
in determining further action, i.e., allow or deny. The coming chapters explain the de-
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sign and implementation details of various security related frameworks proposed in this
thesis.
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Chapter 4
STATIC ANALYSIS OF ANDROID APPLICATION FOR POTENTIAL
MALICIOUS INTENTS
This chapter gives a complete overview of the problem analysis and specific require-
ments, design, implementation and results for the Static Analysis phase of Android appli-
cation.
4.1 Problem Analysis and Requirements
A thorough static analysis of an Android Application can be done which would re-
veal potential places where leakage of user-sensitive information can be tracked from it.
As described in the previous chapter there are already works which are capable of per-
forming a complete static analysis of the Android application. Instead of reinventing the
wheel, this thesis only concentrates on listing potential malicious intents that are capable
of performing a permission re-delegation attack. The functional requirements related to
this phase are listed below.
1. List various possible outgoing intents in the application.
2. Filter them to remove intents whose destination is in the scope of the current ap-
plication.
3. Filter to keep only intents which return the control to the current application from
the deputy application.
4. List out permissions of deputy involved in satisfying the intent to see any possible
information leakage from the deputy application.
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4.2 Design
This section gives a complete overview of the design and various design related deci-
sions taken in static analysis phase of the project. As described in the previous chapter,
thorough static analysis of an Android application can give an idea regarding what can
happen when the application is run. The previous work from Enck et al. and various
others included performing static analysis of Android applications to find out any possi-
ble malicious code in different possible scenarios. The following figures 4.1, 4.2 show a
couple of scenarios where an application is tracking the IMEI number of the device[20].
Figure 4.1: Sample from Static Analysis Depicting the App Tracking IMEI Number of
the Device
Figure 4.2: Static Analysis Depicting Another Instance of IMEI Tracking
Although the static analysis phase of this thesis is not to completely search for various
potentially dangerous candidates but rather the scope is restricted to find the possible
intents which could be used as a potential threat to perform permission re-delegation
attack. The following scenario demonstrates the use of such intents in an application.
4.2.1 Scenario: Permission Re-delegation by Intents
Permission Re-delegation attack as described in the previous chapter can be accom-
plished with the help of Intents, which are used for inter-process communication in An-
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droid. Intents can be used to invoke Activities of other applications in Android and thus
can be taken advantage of to read unauthorized content by apps. The following are the
assumptions considered for this phase of the project.
1. Intents referring to activities in the same application are considered to be good in
this context. Since there is no danger of permission re-delegation.
• So generally any intent start with method like startActivity() can be ig-
nored since, the control would be shifted to the application to which the Ac-
tivity belongs.
2. An intent is only considered harmful if the control returns from the deputy appli-
cation back to the original application.
• So any intent started with method like startActivityForResult() can be
considered as a potential candidate if the intent refers to an Activity out side
the scope of the current application.
3. It is also assumed that application files of deputy applications identified are available
for further static analysis on them.
With the above assumptions and required functional requirements presented in the
previous section, the coming section gives more details on the design.
4.2.2 Design Details
Now that the functional requirements are set for the static analysis, this section gives
details on the actual design of this phase of the project. As we have already seen in the
previous chapters that APK file is a compressed version of various files related to the appli-
cation. From a developer’s point of view the main code files where the actual functional
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and business logic goes in are the Java files related to the application. For the sake of sim-
plicity, excluding the native code in this scenario since the context refers to permission
re-delegation using Intents, a high-level API call in Android. All the java code was bun-
dled together into one .dex file and is packed inside the APK file. Although we could
perform bytecode analysis from .dex, keeping in mind the existing tools which can per-
form static analysis in Java it is for the best if the .dex file can be decompiled back to .java
files. Moreover, decompiling the .dex files back to .java files gives a better idea from devel-
oper perspective to correlate what a particular developer intended to perform with this
code.
Assuming the .dex files can be decompiled back to the actual .java sources, the next
step is to identify for the intents along with the listing target Activity/Action for each
of the intent. This process boils down to a pattern matching problem and which can be
solved with the help of a right parser. Once the intents are identified, the next step is to
identify intents which match the specific cases presented in the steps above, i.e., when the
control returns back from deputy application to that of original application. The eventual
outcome of this system are a list of Intents in the application that can be potential cause
for Permission Re-delegation attack. The Figure 4.3 shows a pictorial representation of
detailed design of the system.
Figure 4.3: Design for Static Analysis of Android Applications to Identify Potential Ma-
licious Intents Causing Permissions Re-delegation Attack
The next section talks about the implementation details and the related results.
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4.3 Implementation and Results
4.3.1 APK Decompiler
The process of decompiling an Android application to its Java source files involves a
2 step process. First, the class.dex file in the apk is converted to jar and then the jar file
is decompiled using the existing methods for java bytecode.
As discussed previously in the Background chapter, classes.dex in an APK file is an
optimized format of all the class files in the Android application. The basic high level idea
of compressing .class files to a dex file involves, integrating the data and constant pools
of all the class files in one place which would reduce redundancy. The next step involves
gathering all the class definitions together in the .dex file. The Figure 4.4 gives a typical
idea of how .java sources are converted to .dex file in Android application development
process[20].
Figure 4.4: Conversion of Java Source Files to classes.dex File in Android Applica-
tions
The same logic is applied to reverse engineer classes.dex file to jar file which is
nothing but an archive of .class files. There are existing tools like dex2jar[5] which
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do the reverse engineering process of converting apk file into jar file. Once the jar file is
obtained from the apk file, the existing java decompiler tool jad is used to decompile the
.class files to the corresponding .java source files. The anatomy of decompiling an APK
to its java sources is depicted in the figure 4.5. Although this process doesn’t decompile
the given apk file back to 100% original source files, but this does work in most cases.
Figure 4.5: Pictorial Representation of APK Decompiler
4.3.2 Parser to Identify Intents
Once the .java source files are decompiled from the given Android application file,
traditional java static code analysis techniques were used to identify the list of possible
intents by parsing the entire source files. The total number of Activities in the current
application which can be retrieved in the AndroidManifest.xml file, as described in the
Background chapter. The intents identified are cross referenced from the activities of the
current application and filtered as per the requirements. The Android Asset Packaging
Tool aapt is used to parse the AndroidManifest.xml file from the apk file[1]. Once these
intents are filtered out the remaining list of intents may correspond to Activities outside
the scope of the current application, among these the only the intents which are called
using startActivityForResult() method are identified. These are the possible list of
potential intents which might cause the permission re-delegation attack.
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4.3.3 Track Permission from API Calls
Once the external intents are identified from the previous step, the apk files for the cor-
responding files are analyzed. The analysis of deputy applications refers to the Activities
to which the original application had made API calls to using intents. From a predefined
list of permissions being correlated to API calls in Android, the possible permissions are
listed out for the concerned Activities. APKInspector[32] tool already utilizes the same
concept in identifying the permissions used with the help of a predefined API calls list.
The figure 4.7 shows a sample snippet on how the API calls are mapped to a permission.
Figure 4.6: Snippet from APKinspector with Mapping of Bluetooth API calls to Permis-
sion BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
Using these, the APKinspector lists the possible permissions the methods in the con-
cerned Activity would need. The figure below shows the screenshot of how APKinspec-
tor lists the permissions that are mapped to the API calls originated from the Activity.
Using all the existing tools and techniques the static analysis of Android applications is
implemented to identify the list of potential candidates for Intents that may be responsible
for permission re-delegation attack.
4.4 Results
The static analysis is tested on a small sample set of Android applications, which de-
livered mixed results. There are cases where the list of possible malicious intents are
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Figure 4.7: Screenshot from APKinspector Identifying Permissions for API calls from
Activities in Android Applications
identified and there are cases where the analysis failed miserably. Listed below are the
shortcomings of the process.
4.4.1 Shortcomings
Lack of context
Although there have been a list of Intents identified, this set doesn’t exactly mean
that the app is necessarily bad.
Failed parsing and permission mapping
The decompilation techniques are not 100% fool proof, there are ways like code
obfuscation which would deliver improper results in the decompilation. Thus the
dependent static code parsing steps would become ineffective.
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In the similar way the mapping of permissions cannot be completely identified due
to the large number of API methods available. More over the possibility of per-
forming the same action in multiple ways make the mapping of permissions with
API methods make it cumbersome.
Availability of Deputy Applications
This process is completely based on the assumption that the application files for all
the deputy applications detected will be available which is not the case unless this
technique is implemented along with access to a full repository of available Android
applications.
Certainty of attack
Although static analysis may be able to identify how an app behaves, but through
static analysis the possibility of attack may be uncertain.
Though this approach of static analysis can be valuable for the specific attack under
consideration, with all the above list of shortcomings for further research of this thesis is
concentrated on dynamic/runtime behavior of applications.
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Chapter 5
ENFORCE PERMISSIONS ON APPLICATIONS DURING INSTALL TIME
The shortcomings for static analysis of Android application illustrate the importance
of permission system in Android. Since access control for every application in Android
depends on the permissions the app possesses. The current way Android is built users
doesn’t have a way to change the permissions of an application. Instead the user is only
notified about the permissions the app is requesting during the install time and the user
has only the capability of not to install the application, if he/she is not satisfied with the
permissions the app needs. The Figure 5.1 shows how an typical install prompt for an ap-
plication being installed from Google Play Store. The figure also shows list of permissions
of an already installed application through the Settings in Android.
As depicted, the user only has the option to either choose to install the application
or not. Typically an app is required to be installed with the required set of permis-
sions in order to avoid any unwanted behavior. But removing a permission from this
set doesn’t necessarily mean the app wouldn’t be able to serve its purpose in the first
place. For instance, the example of Facebook which requires many permissions to dur-
ing installation, suppose a user feels that Facebook application doesn’t require to have the
android.permission.READ_SMS permission. Even though majority of operations con-
cerned to Facebook would still work without having a problem, only the use case where
the application tries to read the SMS from the device would tend to fail due to lack of
permission. Analyzing the Facebook application further reveals that it only tries to read
SMS from the device during the case where Facebook sends a security code as an SMS in
its process of two-step authentication. In this way given the opportunity to choose the
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: (a) An App Listing the Required Permissions at Install-time (b) Permissions
Listed for an App Post-installation.
permissions to the end-user, they will be able to still use the application and feel secure
about the app trying to access user sensitive data.
So this project is aimed at providing a new way for the user to choose the permis-
sions of the application during the install time. The coming sections describe briefly the
functional requirements, design and implementation of this project.
5.1 Problem Analysis and Requirements
As discussed before, this project aimed at providing the user with a new way to choose
permissions during the install time of the applications. This might result in undesirable/i-
nadvertent crashing of the app due to lack of required permissions. So this project works
on the following assumptions:
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• Developers take the responsibility of making sure the app has access to certain per-
mission before actually performing required operation. For instance Figure 5.2,
shows the notification user would get in iOS when an app tries to access a function-
ality for which the access is blocked by the user.
Figure 5.2: Notification in iOS to User Depicting the Requirement of Location Services
by the App for the Required Functionality
This project assumes that the Android applications probe for permissions before
accessing the concerned services. This can be achieved using the API calls check-
Permission, checkCallingPermission and checkCallingOrSelfPermission
in Android. Listing 5.1 shows how the application checks for READ_PHONE_STATE
permission before making an instance to TelephonyManager service to read the
phone number of the device.
Listing 5.1: Application Probing for Related Permission, READ_PHONE_STATE, Be-
fore Accessing the TelephonyManager Service
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...
String permission = "android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE";
int result = mAppContext.checkCallingPermission(permission);
if (result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
TelephonyManager tMgr = (TelephonyManager)mAppContext.
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String mPhoneNumber = tMgr.getLine1Number();
} else {
displayErrorMessage();
}
...
}
• The above approach will let the user to re-install the app, if required, this time by
choosing the proper set of permissions to avoid the undesirable behavior.
5.1.1 Functional Requirements
With the above assumptions in place, the below are the functional requirements that
are listed for providing the facility for users to choose permissions of app during install
time.
1. Parse the APK file to list the permissions of the app.
2. Enable users to choose from the list of permissions for the app.
3. Reconstruct the APK file by only taking into account the permissions user has cho-
sen.
4. Deliver the reconstructed APK file to the user to be installed in the device.
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5.2 Design
With the above requirements specified, the permissions of the app had to be made
configurable by the end user at install time. Since the permissions are listed altogether
in AndroidManifest.xml file, the basic approach for this project would be to identify
the permissions listed in the file. Based on the configuration of user, the permissions in
AndroidManifest.xml file are updated accordingly and the application is rebuilt with the
chosen permissions. With this premise, the steps to design the application are as below:
1. Decompile the required Android app.
2. Parse the AndroidManifest.xml file, to list the permissions the app is requesting.
3. Allow user to choose from the above list of permissions.
4. Update the AndroidManifest.xml file with only the permissions the user had cho-
sen.
5. Rebuild the whole application from the extracted content. Allow user to install the
updated Android app.
Figure 5.3 shows the pictorial representation of the design mentioned in the above
steps.
5.3 Implementation and Results
As seen in the previous chapter, static analysis of an app can be done with the help
of Android application decompilers. Even though as per the design decompiling the An-
droid application is required, it should be noted that high level of granularity in decom-
piling the application is not required. Instead of decompiling to the core java sources the
app can be decompiled to an intermediate smali[4] source files. smali/textttbaskmali
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Figure 5.3: Design for Enabling the User to Choose Permissions of an Android Applica-
tion During Install Time
is an assembler/disassembler for dex format used by Dalvik. The syntax is loosely based
on Jasmin/dedexer’s syntax, and supports full functionality of dex format. Similarly, the
app can also be recompiled directly from the smali codes to dex and build the APK file
from them.
5.3.1 apktool & aapt
Apktool[2] is an open sourced utility which provides the functionality of decompil-
ing, the APK file to the smali codes. This process converts the classes.dex to the
equivalent smali codes. The remainder of the application is extracted as it is, which con-
tains AndroidManifest.xml, assets, lib, build, res folders typically. As seen from
the Bacground chapter, these are the contents of the APK file other than classess.dex
file.
Once these files are extracted using the apktool, the permissions for the app can be
parsed from the AndroidManifest.xml and presented for the user to be chosen. Once
the permissions are chosen, the AndroidManifest.xml is updated accordingly to only
contain the permissions chosen by the user. After updating the manifest file, the contents
could be rebuilt to a APK file using the Application Asset Packaging Tool (aapt). As
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discussed in Background chapter the aapt tool is responsible for building the contents
into a APK file in the first place.
5.3.2 Prototype Model
As a proof of concept, the above model is implemented using a simple web server
which acts as an Android market, giving the user to install Android applications from.
The user can use this web service to configure the application present in the market and
then install the applications with the chosen set of permissions. The figure 5.4 lists the
screen-shots of the prototype application.
5.3.3 Results
This approach decompiles the Android application and only tries to parse the Android-
Manifest.xml, rather than changing any other sources in the application file. Hence, this
approach less susceptible to failure due to previously seen problems in static analysis of
APK. This was evident from the results for this approach, which has 100% successful re-
sults with a test sample of more than 50 android application files. Through this project,
this thesis proposes an Android application to be configurable one rather than a specific
APK file. The configuration can be then mapped to multiple APK files that can be gen-
erated with various combinations of permissions chosen by the user at install time. This
approach also makes the user feel secure by controlling of the type of content the app
can access. Thus making the Android applications to be having user-driven access control
mechanism rather than the traditional app-driven access control mechanism.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 5.4: (a) APK Operations Tool Listing Flashlight App as Configurable App (b) De-
compiling the Flashlight App (c) User Choosing the CAMERA, WAKELOCK, FLASHLIGHT
Permissions Only (d) APK File Rebuilt with the Chosen Permission Configuration (e)
Configured Flashlight Showing Only the Selected Permissions
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Chapter 6
A DYNAMIC FINE-GRAINED PERMISSION ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
The previous chapter proposed how users can be given control of the permissions of
an Android app during install time. Ideally users are less likely to know what permissions
to choose before actually installing and having prior knowledge of the app. This phase of
the project aims at providing the users with a way to enforce permissions for their apps
dynamically during runtime. Such a facility provided at runtime gives more flexibility
for the users to dynamically adjust the access privileges of an application. Compared to
the permission enforcement at install time proposed in the previous chapter, this facility
lets the user to still change the access privileges of the application without the need to
re-install the application. This way the user can still save his current settings/session in
the application and if the user wants to enable/disable a certain permission for the app
he/she could do so right away. This makes the runtime access control for apps as a more
robust and flexible feature compared to the previous approach.
Also to be noted that, during the course of this work, a similar feature was rolled out as
an accident in Android called AppOps in the initial update of Android 4.3, but later this
feature was removed from Android Source Repository. A further comparison is made be-
tween the proposed AppAccessControl and AppOps in section 6.5. The privacy control
feature released in iOS 6 also enables the user to control the usage of sensitive resources
from an application in a similar manner. But unlike the privacy controls in iOS, this pro-
posed system is aimed at providing the users with fine-grained permissions enforcement
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at runtime. Before going into the design & implementation details, the coming section
gives a little background on the way permissions are enforced currently in Android.
6.0 Background: Current Way of Permission Enforcement in Android
Compared to the previous approach where permissions are listed in the manifest file
of the APK file, this approach deals with once the application has been installed on the
device. So in order to achieve this a further understanding is required on how the permis-
sions listed in the AndroidManifest.xml file are transformed to control the application
access rights on the device. As seen from the Background chapter, each Android appli-
cation installed runs as a Linux process in the lower level with a specific access control
mechanism controlled by the permissions of the app during install time. In Android ap-
plications a permission can be enforced in two ways:
Android framework level permissions
These are the kind of permission which are enforced during runtime. In particular
these permissions provide a higher level abstraction and are enforced at a higher
level than the Linux process. Majority of the permissions in Android are of this
category.
Linux process level permissions
These are the kind of permissions which have a direct effect on the low level Linux
process concerned to the Android application. Each of these permissions are trans-
formed into a unique supplementary group-id which is associated with the Linux
process. In turn each group-id has a specific set of access privileges that are prede-
fined. Many permissions which involve direct interaction hardware components
on the device. These include INTERNET, CAMERA, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,
BLUETOOTH etc.
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With the above types of permissions, clearly the associating/disassociate an existing
application with any of the permissions depends on the type of permission. An Android
framework level permission can be controlled directly at the framework level where it
is enforced in the first place. Coming to the Linux process level permissions, the app’s
Linux process has to be associated/disassociated with the corresponding group-id(s), in
order for the enforcement to take effect. Though for the latter to be successful, the Linux
process has to be restarted. Now with this contextual knowledge, the coming sections
describe about the design & implementation details of this phase of project.
6.1 Problem Analysis and Requirements
This project which involves manipulating the access rights of an Android application,
which traditionally could be taken for granted for a particular Android application once
installed. This project assumes that developers take the responsibility of making sure the
application first probes for the availability of certain access before trying to perform the
required operation. This ensures that app would notify the problem to the user rather
than crashing. Figure 6.1 is a screen shot of a famous application Viber which notifies
the user that the concerned operation requires the user to enable location services. Al-
though the application is in iOS, the underlying message is that this project assumes the
permission-related failures are handled accordingly by the developers of the app.
6.1.1 Functional Requirements
The below listed are the functional requirements for providing the facility to enforce
permissions during runtime to users.
1. Provide user with a listing of apps on the device along with fine grained permissions
concerned to each app.
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Figure 6.1: Notification in iOS to User Depicting the Requirement of Location Services
by Viber App for the Required Functionality
2. Maintain a centralized repository to keep track of user’s changes to the permissions
of apps.
3. Ability to enforce the permission at the right (Android Framework/ Linux Process)
level dynamically.
6.2 Design
With the above functional requirements, the figure 6.2 shows the design diagram of
the dynamic permissions enforcement mechanism proposed called AppAccessService.
The AppAccessService is a system level service which is responsible for enforcing per-
missions at runtime for an application. The service takes care of whether the permission
is Process level or Framework level enforced. Based on the application’s operations in
runtime, the dynamic permission check are regulated using the AppAccessService.
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Figure 6.2: High-level Design Depicting the Control of Access for Apps Using App-
AccessService
6.3 Implementation and Results
With the above higher level design, the main objective of AppAccessService is to
enforce an additional check to control the access privileges of an app at runtime. With
the two types of permissions described in the previous section, the following are the ap-
proaches to block the concerned permission.
6.3.1 Approach
6.3.1.1 Enforce Permission at Framework Level
As described earlier in the Background chapter, the checkPermission() method
from ActivityManagerService is claimed[3] to be the only public entry point for per-
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missions checking. Figure 6.3 shows the method definition from the latest AOSP 1 repos-
itory by Google.
Figure 6.3: checkPermission in ActivityManagerService Mentioned as the Only
Public Entry Point for Permissions Checking
Clearly modifying the AOSP to add additional check in the checkPermission()
method is the simpler approach to enforce a permission at Android Framework level.
6.3.1.2 Enforce Permission at Linux Process Level
Unlike the framework approach, in order to enforce a permission at Linux process
level for an app in Android involves set/remove the corresponding supplementary group-
id for that application. In order to achieve this, there should be a clear understanding first
on how an application is launched in Android. The section 2.6.2 from the Background
chapter, clearly elucidates how an application is launched in Android. This involves three
steps: 1) Creating the process, 2) Binding the application and 3) Launching the applica-
tion. The steps for creating the process are analyzed carefully and the function calls are
back tracked from the stack to identify where the group ids are set for an app’s Linux
1Android Open-Source Project
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process. The following are the key functions which are involved in setting the group-id
for a package.
Get gids of a Package
The Background chapter clearly shows how PackageManagerService is responsible
for parsing the Android application files and caching the key information related to a
package. In this regard, the method getPackageGids() from PackageManagerService
is responsible for returning the gids which are assigned to the Linux process being created
for the application from ActivityManagerService as described in section 2.6.2. Figure
6.4 shows the definition of the method from PackageManagerService.
Figure 6.4: getPackageGids() in PackageManagerService
The above code excerpt, doesn’t exactly specify how the permissions are mapped to
the gids. A careful analysis of the call sequence shows that after a bunch of calls, the
permission are then mapped to the group ids from the data/etc/platform.xml and
figure 6.5 depicts an excerpt from the same.
The above file is used as a base by Android framework to translate Android permis-
sions to group IDs but the actual translation to the numeric group id is done somewhere at
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Figure 6.5: Excerpt from data/etc/platform.xmlDepicting the Mapping of Low-level
Group-IDs with Permissions in Android
a deeper level android_filesystem_config.h. This is the header definition which the
native code utilizes to map the gid like net_bt to the actual numeric equivalent gid 3002.
The figure 6.6 clearly show how in the lower-level reserved user IDs, group IDs and range
of app user IDs that are mapped to an Android application once during its installation.
With the above knowledge, instead of adding additional checks to the lower level en-
tities in the system to interact with AppAccessService, the additional checks could be
placed in the getPackageGids() method. Since this method is involved in fetching the
group IDs related to the Linux process of the Android application, the check in this place
gives a simpler solution that would enforce the permission at Linux process level.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.6: (a) Lists the Masters Users and Groups That Are Predefined in the System (b)
Supplementary Group-IDs of the Hardware Components Interacting with the Kernel (c)
Range of User IDs Assigned to the Installed Apps on the Device
6.3.2 Prototype Model
With the approach defined clearly from the previous section, a prototype model of
the proposed AppAccessService is implemented on a Android 4.0 ice-cream sandwich
repository. The following are the main components of the implementation.
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SystemServer
Traditional SystemServer responsible for starting various services during the start
up of an Android Device. This is responsible for the start up of AppAccessService
after bringing up the required services.
IAppAccessService
The Android Interface Definition Language file that is linked with the actual App-
AccessService. This enables the Binder IPC communication between the actual
service and other interacting services/components.
AppAccessService
The actual service where the operations are defined, the primary operations are
listed below:
1. getBlockedPermissions( ): Returns the list of blocked permissions for the given
package.
2. updateBlockedPermissions( ): Update the blocked permission list for an appli-
cation with the new list passed to it.
3. getBlockedGids( ): Returns the list of blocked group IDs for the given package.
4. isPermissionBlocked( ): Returns whether the given permission is blocked by the
user for the given app.
AppAccessControl app
The UI app which is presented to the end user to control the fine-grained permis-
sions of applications installed on the device.
PackageManagerService
The traditional PackageManagerService with an updated getPackageGids()method
which removes the blocked gids returned from AppAccessService for the app.
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ActivityManagerService
The traditional ActivityManagerService with an updated checkPermission()method
which now runs an additional check to see if the permission is blocked as per AppAccessService.
If so, this method behaves as if the checkPermission returns DENY response.
With the above components updated in the AOSP, figure 6.7 depicts the UML class
diagram representation of only the modified components of AOSP.
Figure 6.7: Class Diagram of the Implemented Dynamic Permission Control Prototype
AppAccessService
6.3.3 Repository to Store Blocked Permissions
The list of blocked permissions for each application need to be stored in persistent
memory for it to be accessed by AppAccessService. An xml format is chosen as a repos-
itory for simplicity and consistency. Below is the structure of the xml element which
stores the list of blocked permissions. This file named as acl.xml file is created, if not
already present, at the /data/ directory in Android device.
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Listing 6.1: Structure of XML File Used as Repository to Store Blocked Permissions
<packages>
<package name="pkg.name" uid="pkguid">
<blocked-permission>PERMISSION_1</blocked-permission>
<blocked-permission>PERMISSION_2</blocked-permission>
...
</package>
...
</packages>
The API methods listed in AppAccessService, read from the above xml file and re-
turn the results accordingly. Also, it should be noted that the above xml file doesn’t store
group IDs related to the permission. AppAccessService is designed to map the permis-
sions to their corresponding group IDs and the result of getBlockedGids() is returned
after the conversion of the blocked permissions from xml file to their equivalent group
IDs. This is done using a custom mapping data structure combining the data shown in
figures 6.5 and 6.6.With the service well designed the coming sections discuss about the
results and other effects of AppAccessService.
6.3.4 Results
The above prototype implemented on ice-cream sandwich AOSP repository. The re-
sultant services are then tested on emulator at first in Android. Tests show that AppAccessService
was capable of enforcing all type of permissions on apps. Figure 6.8 shows the screen-
shots of App Access Control app which serves as a interface between end user and the
AppAccessService. This shows how a user controls the permissions for an app.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.8: (a) App Access Control Listing All the Installed Applications on the De-
vice (b) Listing of Permissions Requested for a Particular App, Flashlight along with the
Current Status of Permissions (c) Enabling the User to Configure the Permissions for
Flashlight Application
6.3.5 Restricting Permissions for Facebook Application
As part of testing the AppAccessService, the renown Facebook app is used for block-
ing both types of permissions. Facebook application was chosen for testing the permis-
sion control framework since the app was developed with exceptional handling in most
of the cases which arise due to disabling permissions for apps using AppAccessService.
6.3.5.1 Linux Process-level Permissions
App Access Control app was used to disable INTERNET, CAMERA & LOCATION per-
missions for Facebook app. After disabling these permissions, launching the Facebook
application would result in restricted access for the app. The log statements tracked show
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the group ids with which the Facebook app’s Linux process was created. This is depicted
in the figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: Log Depicting Facebook App Launched with Just Single Group-ID 1015
Related to WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE. The Blocked Group-IDs 3003, 1006 Refer to
INTERNET and CAMERA Respectively
With INTERNET permission blocked, the figure 6.10a shows how the app is unable to
login. Correspondingly the log also shows the details error with respect to how the app
is unable to resolve the domain name api.facebook.com as depicted in figure 6.11.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.10: (a) Facebook App Unable to Login with the Error Prompt Showing
CONNECTION_FAILURE Message (b) Facebook App Unable to Gather Location Due to
Lack of LOCATION Permission
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Figure 6.11: Log Depicting Facebook App Unable to Resolve the Domain Name api.-
facebook.com Due to Lack of INTERNET Permission
6.3.5.2 Framework-level Permissions
Just the same way as the Linux process level permissions, the permissions enforced
at the framework level also are tested with Facebook application. The most notable
LOCATION permission is disabled for Facebook application which results in the failure
prompt as shown in figure 6.10b.
6.4 AppAccessService to Block Permission Re-delegation
6.4.1 Problem due to intents
As discussed above the same Facebook application launched by disabling the CAMERA
permission. But the figure 6.12 shows the camera functionality still working in Face-
book application. This failure in letting the Facebook application use camera even after
blocking by AppAccessService can be attributed to Permission Re-delegation. Block-
ing the permissions for an application only restricts the API calls that originate from that
application in Android. After a careful analysis of the Facebook application it can be un-
derstood that CameraActivity in Facebook, with package name com.facebook.katana,
launches the camera activity in the device’s camera denoted by the package name com.-
android.camera. In this way even after blocking the permission for an application, the
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Figure 6.12: Camera Being Used by Facebook Even after Launching the App after Dis-
abling the Camera Permission Using AppAccessService
app can still get to use some of the blocked resources with the help of Intents. To avoid
this AppAccessService was used to block Permissions Re-delegation attack.
6.4.2 Problem Analysis and Requirements
The previous chapters already demonstrated in detail about permission re-delegation
attack that is feasible using the IPC mechanisms in Android. Although the above projects
in Chapter 4 show static analysis of Android applications to list the Intents (Android’s IPC
mechanism) that can be a potential cause for permission re-delegation attack. The static
analysis also has a lot of shortcomings due to which the attacks cannot be guaranteed.
This phase of the project tries to evade the permission re-delegation attack at runtime
using the AppAccessService.
Consider app A is trying to invoke app B using intents, let P (X ) denote the original
permissions of app X. Assume PA(B) indicates permissions of app B when launched by
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app A expecting data to be exchanged from app B to app A. This thesis proposes the
following as the requirement in order to block permission re-delegation,
PA(B) = P (A)∩ P (B)
The key point in the above scenario is identifying if the control is coming back to
the calling application, which in this example is app A. The previous chapters had al-
ready showed that an intent can be launched from Activities majorly using the variants
API methods startActivity(), startActivityForResult(). Among these Chap-
ter 4, already describes startActivityForResult() as the method which is susceptible
for launching other Activities using intents and returning the control back to the caller
Activity. The below subsections demonstrate the design and implementation aspects of
using AppAccessService to block permission re-delegation attack.
6.4.3 Design
The previous section identifies the API methods to be fixed as startActivityFor-
Result() method of Activity class. On a higher level, the solution proposed is to iden-
tify the intents passed to this API method, the intent is then mapped to the concerned
application. Consider the application from which the API call is being made for start-
ActivityForResult() as the caller app and the application to which the intent is mapped
as the callee app. At each invocation startActivityForResult(), both the caller and
callee apps are identified. If the caller app and callee app are not the same, then ideally
there is a chance of permission re-delegation attack. Even though the above condition
does eliminate permission re-delegation completely, but this would also block applica-
tions not to load properly in the first place. The reason being application launch it self
uses the same API call from Launcher application in Android. In order to avoid such
application loading problems, if the caller app is any of the preloaded Android applica-
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tions on the device then these API calls are exempted from this check. With the above
assumption, the figure 6.13 shows the updated class diagram. As highlighted the start-
ActivityForResult() methods from Activity interacts with the AppAccessService to
blockPermissionRedelegation().
Figure 6.13: Updated Class Diagram of AppAccessService Depicting the New block-
PermissionRedelegation() Method API
6.4.4 Implementation
The design subsection elucidates what exactly should be in place to block permis-
sion re-delegation attack. Since AppAccessService already has the capability to block
permissions for the apps, the same can be used to block permission re-delegation attack.
The idea is to identify the permissions of caller and callee apps, as defined in the require-
ments section identify the permissions of callee app which doesn’t satisfy the condition
PA(B) = P (A) ∩ P (B). The permissions identified above constitute the set of blocked
permissions for callee app, these can be blocked using updateBlockedPermissions()
method of AppAccessService. Once the control is given back to the caller app, the pre-
vious block operation can be undone to restore callee app to its usual state with respect
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to its access control permissions. Listing 6.2 shows the high level pseudocode for this
operation.
Listing 6.2: Pseudocode for blockPermissionRedelegation() Method
void blockPermissionRedelegation(String callerApp, String calleeApp) {
Set callerPermissions = getCurrentPermissions(callerApp);
Set calleePermissions = getCurrentPermissions(calleeApp);
Set blockedCalleePermissions = {};
foreach (permission : callerPermissions) {
if ( !calleePermissions.contains(permission) ) {
blockedCalleePermissions.add(permission);
}
}
// API call to AppAccessService to update permissions for callee app
updateBlockedPermissions(calleeApp, blockedCalleePermissions);
}
6.4.5 Effectiveness
Blocking permissions for apps temporarily to avoid permission re-delegation although
seems to effect other applications considerably. But it actually doesn’t have a problem
since, the way Android is designed as a single app running in the foreground. Although
Android supports multiple processes to run in the background, at a given time only one
application seem to be running at the foreground for the user. This feature in Android
helps to support the proposed design to block permission re-delegation in this thesis.
Moreover, the background applications are not guaranteed to run since Android system
kills the least recently used background applications to free memory to accommodate
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for other active applications. In the same way the callee app can be restarted in order to
enforce the new permissions during the even of permission re-delegation.
6.4.6 Results
The proposed design has been implemented as a prototype on the ice-cream sandwich
Android repo base. The scenario presented in the motivating example in Figure 1.1 is
recreated. To recapitulate the scenario involves a dangerous app without CAMERA permis-
sion trying to access the resource using deputy application in this case Barcode Scanner
app represented by package com.google.zxing.client.android.
With the scenario elucidated, the figure 6.14 shows the logcat statements which clearly
show how the permissions of callee app are blocked to make sure the caller app doesn’t get
any extra information from resources which are not accessible for caller app. The log files
have been split for better understanding, it should be noted that the below log constitutes
of a single action when loading the Barcode Application from the dangerous app to use
camera. The resultant response presented to the user in the foreground is depicted in
figure 6.15. Thus the permission re-delegation/ permission escalation attack is shown to
be evaded with the help of AppAccessService.
6.5 Comparing AppAccessService with AppOps
As discussed previously, AppOps was released by Android for a brief timespan. The
AppOps also provides the user to controlled fine grained permissions for applications
on the device. On the foreground, both AppOps and AppAccesscontrol app look much
similar and the same is depicted in figure 6.16. Even though the interfaces look similar,
the internal design concerned with how an Android application is being restricted differ a
lot. For instance, AppAccessService restricts the permissions of applications by loading
the app with a restricted set of permissions, and inserted code to check if permission is
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blocked by AppAccessService is present majorly at two places: 1) PackageManager-
Service for gids 2) ActivityManagerService for permission checks.
On the contrary for AppOps, restricting the Applications to various services is done
by intercepting about a dozen services. The following code analysis in figure 6.17 shows
that AppOps had inserted a bunch of permission checking functions in a variety of services[35].
In this aspect, the approach proposed in this thesis for restricting the permissions of ap-
plications at runtime is much simpler than that of AppOps.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.14: (a) startActivityForResult() Method Listing Permissions and Group-
IDs of Both Caller & Callee Apps (b) Shows AppAccessService Blocking All the Extra
Permissions ofCallee App (c) Shows the Launch ofCallee Appwith Restricted Permissions,
Mainly CAMERA, The Activity in Barcode Scanner Unable to Load Camera Due to Lack
of Privilege
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Figure 6.15: Error Prompt on Barcode Scanner Application Generated by Blocking Per-
mission Re-delegation.
Figure 6.16: Similarity Between the Interfaces of AppOps Vs AppAccessControl User
Facing Apps
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Figure 6.17: Traces of AppOps Being Present Across All the Services in Android Source
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Chapter 7
BACKGROUND PERMISSIONS USAGE OF ANDROID APPLICATIONS
AppAccessService proposed in the previous chapter is capable of blocking permis-
sion re-delegation attack and more importantly providing the user with the ability to
control the access privileges of Android applications installed on the device. One of the
major problem with the permission model in Android is that if an app is granted a par-
ticular permission then the app can make use the concerned resources as long as the app is
installed on the device. As described previously, these permissions are enforced silently
at execution time by the app. Hence there seem to be no restrictions what so ever on the
amount of usage of the resources governed through the permission for the app.
Of the related works in this aspect with providing a user centered approach, Apex[30]
proposed by Nauman et al. suggested an extension to the Android permission model by
enforcing user-defined constraints. Bai et al. proposed a context-aware usage control for
Android[7], which takes into consideration the context data of user to enhance the protec-
tion of user’s privacy. Further work in this thesis aims to provide a user centered approach
to enhance privacy by taking into consideration by taking the context of the application
running. Also, during the course of this work involving restricting applications based on
running context, a similar feature was released as part of iOS 8 privacy controls which
enables the user to control Location services with regards to the running status of the
app. A further description of this feature is presented in section 7.5.
7.1 Problem Analysis and Requirements
As described before the permissions are silently enforced at runtime for the Android
applications, this doesn’t stop the application from accessing resources the app has been
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privileged to use even if it is not strictly required to serve end user. Especially if the re-
sources effect the privacy of the user, the risk is even higher of the application unnecessar-
ily accessing the user-sensitive data from the device. A motivating example which explains
this scenario, relates to those kind of applications which utilize the user’s current location
to identify nearby related services for the user. There are many such renowned applica-
tions and Foursquare, Yelp, Google Places are a few among this list. Although the end
user needs these kind of applications to access the current location of the user, it doesn’t
stop the application from constantly tapping the user’s location even if the user is not
actively using these applications.
As seen in related work by Felt et al.[23] suggests that very less percentage of users
pay attention to check and understand the permissions an application is requesting dur-
ing installation. This definitely proves that completely leveraging of the end-user to take
care of his/her privacy is also not a viable option. With the above scenario in mind, this
thesis proposes to restrict applications based on the context of the applications running
on the device. When this chapter mentions about context of an Android application run-
ning, it refers to whether the application is running in the background or it is running in
foreground. Thus this project aims at providing the user to control applications’ resource
usage based on the running context of the applications. In addition to the AppAccess-
Control which already is proposed to provide the users with a fine-grained permission
management system in Android, allowing the users to enforce permissions on the app
based on the application’s running context also helps the users to ensure their privacy
from background spoofing applications.
On the other hand, the permission usage statistics for applications along with their
running context definitely helps in identifying malicious applications when implemented
on large scale. In general there is a conception that an application is made to undergo vet-
ting process before the applications are made available in Google Play store to be down-
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loaded by end user. Even if there exists one vetting process the surmounting statistics
on the percentage of malware applications reported[24], makes the vetting process quite
ineffective. Many instances where the malware application was taken down from the
Google Play store after reporting suggests even more about the ineffectiveness of the vet-
ting process in Google Play store[9]. This thesis also aims at providing a viable solution to
identify the background spoofing applications from permission usage analysis. This solu-
tion if utilized by the centralized app governing systems like Google Play store, Amazon
appstore etc, might be able to identify malicious applications even more effectively and
can eventually ensure the security of the end user.
This phase assumes that the permission usage related to the applications which are
running in the foreground are not considered a threat to the user’s privacy. With the
above basic assumption and a clear problem statement, the following are the functional
requirements for tracking the background permission usage of Android applications.
7.1.1 Functional Requirements
1. Identify the running context of an Android application.
2. Provide a way for the end user to enforce constraints on permission usage of appli-
cation based on the running context.
3. Block the application from accessing a particular resource based on the constraint
specified by the user on the governing permission.
4. Provide a way for a centralized entity like Play store, to notify background spoofing
activity of applications running on user’s device.
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7.2 Design
The major challenge from the above proposed requirement lies in identifying the
proper running status of the application. Refreshing the basics of how an application
is run in Android, sure does help in order to correctly identify the running status of the
Android application. As described in detail in the previous chapters, an application in An-
droid in the low level is a Linux process(es) which is launched with a unique user ID. Also
traditionally Android is a variant of single foreground tasking operating system, which
essentially means there is one active application at a given time running in the foreground.
Even though there can be multiple applications running in parallel in Android and each of
which can be made active by selecting them from the list of running apps. The Figure 7.1
shows the latest rendition, from Android L, of running apps stacked and an application
from the stack can be made active.
Figure 7.1: Multi-tasking in Android
So even though Android supports multitasking there could only be one foreground
application running at a given time. This feature can be taken advantage of in trying
to determine the running context of an application. During permission checking, an
application can be termed as foreground if an Activity from the application is currently
in foreground and vice versa. Once the status of the application is known, based on the
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user preference read from AppAccessService the permission check can be ALLOWED or
DENIED.
Irrespective of the choice above, the permission usage can be logged for background
applications to be further provided as input for the centralized app governing body, which
then can decide whether the application is malicious based on the volume of permission
usage and the risk factor of the requested permission.
With the above design characteristics, now the higher level design would modify the
design proposed for AppAccessService earlier to the Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Design of Permission Check Being on App’s Running Context
7.2.1 Limitations
Although this model aims to protect background spoofing for applications, this works
only with the type of permissions which are enforced at Android framework level rather
than the ones enforced at a low level Linux group IDs. Although AppAccessService can
74
be made to enforce the Linux group ID level permissions by restarting the application
whenever the application running context changes from background to foreground and
vice versa, but this approach wouldn’t preserve the current state of the application since
it needs to be restarted. The major group ID permissions which can be used by third
party apps and are considered to govern access to resources sensitive to user’s privacy are
EXTERNAL_STORAGE, INTERNET, CAMERA and BLUETOOTH. Apart from the above per-
missions, the proposed solution only prevents background spoofing of Android applica-
tions with respect to all permissions enforced at Android Framework level.
7.3 Implementation and Results
As described previously, the only API call which is publicly accessible to check for
permissions and is called internally by various system level services to check for per-
missions is checkPermission() API call in ActivityManagerService. Activity-
ManagerService maintains a stack of Activities that the user is interacting with, labeled
as mMainStack. Ideally the top of the stack in mMainStack represents the foreground
Activity that is shown to the end user. Whenever an API call to checkPermission()
is made, the package name is identified for the corresponding application and then it is
compared to that of the application the top Activity in the stack belongs to. If they both
match the application making the API call is labeled as a foreground application at the
given instant otherwise it is labeled as a background application. Listing 7.1 shows the
code snippet representing the simple way of labeling the running status of an Android
application in ActivityManagerService.
Listing 7.1: Code Snippet Determining Application’s Running Status
public int checkPermission(String permission, int pid, int uid) {
...
boolean isForeground = false;
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String packageName = getPackageName(uid);
ActivityRecord top = getTopOfStack(mMainStack);
isForeground = top
.intent
.getComponent()
.getPackageName()
.equalsIgnoreCase(packageName);
...
}
Once the application running context is determined as above, the rest is quite trivial as
described in the previous chapter with respect to using AppAccessService to block the
permission call made by the application. The status of the permission API call can also be
logged for further parsing from Play store servers as proposed in the problem statement.
7.3.1 Prototype
A prototype was built to identify and block the permissions for applications based on
running context. The figure 7.3 shows the change in the interface built for the user, to
control framework level permissions according to the application running context, and
shows how it is transformed from the original interface depicted in figure 6.8. The figure
clearly shows the preliminary difference in how the permission control is represented to
the user. All the depicted permissions for Facebook application, can now be set based
on the running context of the application. Not all permissions can be chosen to be en-
forced based on the app’s running context, figure 7.4 shows how the App Access Control
interface differs for the renowned Flashlight application.
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Figure 7.3: Old Vs New Interface of AppAccessService Enabling the Users to Config-
ure Permissions Based on Running Context of the Application
Figure 7.4: Old Vs New Interface of AppAccessService for Flashlight Application
As we can see a framework level permission can have three choices now, instead of
two as seen before, Always/Never/When In Use. By choosing the When In Use option,
the user would be able to selectively allow the permission only when the app is running
in the foreground. All the background permission checks of the app with respect to that
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Total Count Background Count Percentage
All apps 50342 47172 93.70%
Most used apps sample 2876 1847 64.22%
Spyware apps sample 308 134 43.51%
Table 7.1: Permission Check Count Analysis for Sample Applications
permission are denied. Thus the user can feel safe of sensitive data not being tracked when
the app is not active.
7.3.2 Permission Usage Analysis
A sample of the applications were tested to find out the permission usage statistics
especially with respect to the running context of the application. The sample consisted
of set of ten top downloaded applications currently in Android Play store along with a
small sample of five known malware/spyware applications in Android. The sample of
these 15 applications along with a set of more than 30 default applications that come with
the device already are tested to track the permission usage of applications with respect
to the application’s running context. The permission usage analysis was determined by
running through various possible use cases of the sample applications and all the calls to
the public API checkPermission() are to tracked obtain a list of detailed statistics. The
table 7.1 summarizes the total number of permission checks made by applications during
the period of testing.
As depicted in table 7.1 more than 83% of the overall 50342 permission checks are
done by the default system applications which is quite understandable since the sample is
dominated by stock Android applications preloaded on the device. Even though the table
shows more than 60% of permission checks done by the sample of most used applications
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turns out to be background checks, this data cannot be used to classify any of the back-
ground checks as a threat to user’s privacy. The same can be attributed to the spyware
sample as well. Though table 7.1 cannot be used to analyze the list of permission checks
that can be categorized as a threat to user’s privacy, the data is actually presented to get
an idea of the amount of processing which goes in the background with respect to simple
actions made by end-user by using the applications in the foreground.
Further analysis involved tracking of permission checks of only the sample applica-
tions barring the stock Android applications, and also taking into consideration only the
permissions which relate to user’s privacy like LOCATION, SMS, PHONE_STATE, CONTACTS,
RECORD_AUDIO etc.
7.3.2.1 Spyware Sample Analysis
The five malware/spyware applications chosen are listed along with their known at-
tacks possible which let the application steal information considered as sensitive to the
end user.
SMS RU - org.me.androidapplication1
Contains a known Trojan capable of sending SMS from the effected device to pre-
mium numbers like 3353, 3354[38].
Roidsec - cn.phoneSync
Contains a Trojan capable of sending sensitive user information like SMS, call log,
contacts, location and other usage information to remote location. Once installed
the application doesn’t have a launcher[36].
Ear spy - com.microphone.earspy
Known spyware tool available in Play store. Capable of eavesdropping from the
surroundings.
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LOCATION SMS IMEI RECORD CONTACTS
SMS RU Ø
Roidsec Ø Ø Ø Ø
Ear spy Ø Ø
Antsmasher Ø Ø
Android SPY Ø
Table 7.2: Critical Background Permission Checks for Malware Applications Sample
Antsmasher - com.bestcoolfungames.antsmasher
A spy-ware game application capable of stealing information in the background
while the user is playing the game[37].
Android SPY - sms.monitoring.app
A spyware tool capable of sending the received SMS to a configured email.
With the background on the sample spyware applications, the table 7.2 shows the
critical background permission checks detected with the proposed methodology in this
thesis.
It is to be noted that the spyware applications tested didn’t completely cover all pos-
sible usecases during testing and the results shown in the table 7.2 only correlate to the
limited usage of the application. Even this limited usage proved to be significant in detect-
ing the background permission checks made by these applications, especially with respect
to the SMS & CONTACTS. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach proposed in
this thesis.
80
7.3.2.2 Most Used Sample Analysis
The most used applications sampled for testing include renown applications in the
following six categories in the Android application market.
Figure 7.5: Most Used Sample Applications
The testing on the most used applications sample, identified the LOCATION permis-
sion being used in the background by almost all applications in the sample. Especially
with respect to Facebook app (com.facebook.katana), the total number of permission
checks for ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION in the tested usecases turned out to be 100% in the
background (64 out of 64 checks). Table 7.3 depicts the traces of background permission
checks from the applications identified with regards to the critical permissions.
The instance of permission check involving the KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESS permis-
sion. Typically Android applications bearing this permission have the capability to kill
few apps running in the background majorly to conserve memory and CPU time. In
the same way Clean Master, one of the famous utility app, tries to kill few applications
in the background and the same traces have been identified. This instance also demon-
strates the effectiveness of the proposed approach in tracing the background activities of
applications.
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LOCATION IMEI CONTACTS RECORD KILL_BG_PROC
Facebook Ø
Messenger Ø Ø
Foursquare Ø
REI Ø
Prize Claw F F F
Clean Master Ø Ø
Flashlight F F F
Google Maps Ø Ø
Table 7.3: Critical Background Permission Checks for Most-used Applications Sample.
F - Foreground Permission Checks.
7.3.2.3 Static Analysis Based on Permission Usage
Other than LOCATION & READ_PHONE_STATE permissions which being tracked in the
background, the other notable finding from this sample are the permission checks orig-
inating from Prize Claw application to the permissions RECORD_AUDIO & CAMERA. Al-
though the application do not bear these particular permissions, further static analysis of
the application determined that these checks originated due to the probing for permission
in the background. Figure 7.6 depicts code originated from Prize Claw application that
is responsible for the permission checks for unauthorized permissions.
Once the permission check statistics for the application are known, static analysis of
the application in order to identify the code snippet causing the permission check in the
first place becomes easier. Since the details of the outcome are known and hence static
analysis is more result-driven reverse engineering. Thus this approach can be used to
identify vulnerable applications in Android after being released for usage of end user.
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7.4 Crowd-sourcing Way of Finding Vulnerable Apps Post Release
The previous section demonstrates the effectiveness of permission usage of applica-
tions taking into consideration the running context of the application. The same ap-
proach can be utilized in identifying potential malicious apps that put the user’s privacy
at risk. The following steps demonstrate the design proposed for this scenario.
1. Traditionally Google Play acts as a centralized authority to load Android applica-
tions onto a device.
2. Each device keeps track of the permission usage of applications with respect to the
running context.
3. The permission usage statistics are collected by another centralized authority for
analysis.
4. The applications found misusing the permissions by the analysis of permission us-
age statistics are further made to undergo careful vetting process.
5. The vetting process aims at causal analysis of the abnormal permission usage statis-
tics.
6. Based on the causal analysis the malicious applications which potentially cause risk
to user’s privacy can be identified to take further action.
The design proposed involves the methodologies of crowd sourcing where in each
android device acts as an individual entity in crowd sourcing rather than making the
end user boar the onus of securing privacy by aptly choosing application settings using
AppAccessService. The proposed design is pictorially represented in figure 7.7.
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7.5 iOS 8 Privacy Controls: Location Services
iOS 8 is the latest version of Apple’s mobile operating system, which was released
recently during September 2014. iOS is renown for its famous security update in iOS 6
which provides the user with a privacy controls enabling the users to control access to
sensitive data for applications on the device. The figure 7.8 depicts the privacy settings
provided in iOS 6 which remained unchanged in iOS 7 as well.
The advent of smart phones revolutionized the mobile marketing which is targeting
the audience bearing smart phones to gather important user sensitive information espe-
cially user’s location. Most of the applications tend to transmit user location along with
preferences to the marketing agencies risking the privacy of many users[25]. In addition
to providing the privacy settings, Apple also provided a way for the user to allow Loca-
tion services while using the app as well instead of the previous seen Allow and Deny. The
following is the excerpt from iOS 8 Security documentation by Apple.
“From Settings, access can be set to never allowed, allowed when in use, or always,
depending on the apps´ requested location use. Also, if apps granted access to use location
at any time make use of this permission while in background mode, users are reminded
of their approval and may change an apps´ access. ”[6]
The figure 7.9 shows the change in the privacy control feature in iOS 8 especially
related to Location Service. This updated privacy setting in iOS 8 looks a lot similar to
the interface in the proposed design as shown in figure 7.3. Even though the ideologies of
the iOS 8 updated privacy settings and the AppAccessService permission enforcement
based on running context of the application are similar. The fact that iOS 8 is developed
as a commercial product environment unlike open sourced Android makes it completely
coincidental for this similarity. Moreover the similar idea already put into action although
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not in a fine-level granularity, also affirms credibility and the importance of the approach
proposed in this thesis.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7.6: (a) Code from Millennial Media Ad-packages Used in Prize Claw Application
Checking for Availability of CAMERA Permission (b) Smali Code Snippet from Inmobi
Ad-packages in Prize Claw Probing for RECORD_AUDIO Permission (c) Code Snippet from
Prize Claw Application Capable of Recording the Audio from the Device If Granted the
Permission RECORD_AUDIO
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Figure 7.7: Proposed Design for Identifying Malicious Android Applications Post-
Release Using the Background Permission Usage Analysis
Figure 7.8: The Privacy Settings in iOS 6 Listing the Apps Which Use Contacts and
Location Services
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.9: (a) Location Service’s Privacy Control Prompting the User to Choose Back-
ground Location Setting of Application (b) Privacy Control Updated View of Location
Services Having 3 Options Never, While Using the App, Always
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Present day smart phones tend to become more powerful and helpful resource for
many users. The increasing computing ability of the device is also bringing the users
more closer to the smart phones and definitely they are no longer used just as a means
of elementary communication like talk and text. The growing computing ability also
demands a responsibility of the smart phone to ensure the privacy of the user. With An-
droid having the majority of the smart phone market share, this thesis proposes a better
mechanism in Android to enhance user’s privacy protection. The current status of An-
droid relies on app-driven permission control management, which makes the user having
less control of what privileges to grant to an application in Android.
This thesis proposes an approach to make the permission management of Android
applications more user-driven rather than app-driven. Taking into consideration of the
current security architecture in Android, a simple and effective security framework is pro-
posed which allows users to control the permissions of applications in Android. Apart
from allowing users to choose permissions for the applications on the device, this thesis
also showcases the robustness of this simple AppAccessService. The same service can be
used to block a typical attack in Android called Permission Re-delegation or Permission
escalation attack which is inherent due to the IPC design in Android. Also this thesis pro-
poses a novel approach of restricting applications based on running context of themselves.
The fact that the application running context permission usage proposed to be used in a
crowd sourced manner in assessing the risks of the the app at runtime makes it unique.
Even though this thesis addresses runtime issues and accesses the vulnerability of the
application after the malicious app attempts to do some damage, more work needs to be
89
done in trying to assess the dangers involved in apps accessing resources in the foreground.
Thus the future work needs to focus more on extending similar approach proposed to clas-
sify the permission checks from the foreground which doesn’t relate to the user’s activity
as a potential threat and should be blocked.
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